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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BRUSSELS 004758

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DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/RPM, EUR/ERA S/WCI FOR AMBASSADOR PROSPER SARAJEVO FOR AMBASSADOR MCELHANEY AND JENIFER MOORE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/03/2014 TAGS: PREL MOPS PHUM BK NATO EUN USEU BRUSSELS
SUBJECT: DSACEUR'S EU POLAD CLARIFIES DELINEATION OF TASKS **ISSUES**

REF: A. MEMORANDUM ON "DECONFLICTION AND DELINEATION OF TASKS (HQ EUFOR AND NHQ SA" FROM COMEUFOR TO DSACEUR DATED OCTOBER 24 ¶B. AND SUBSEQUENT REVISIONS.

Classified By: Col. Michael Ryan, USEU Defense Advisor for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

- 🔨 1. (U) This is a retransmission of Brussels 4731. Paragraph 4 has been corrected for clarity.
- (C) Summary: EU Council Secretariat planners are unhappy with a number of points in the Delineation of Tasks between COMEUFOR and Commander Nato Headquarters (COMNHQ), but they will not raise further objections. Some aspects of the agreement between commanders on the ground contravene the guidance given by the EUMC to COMEUFOR. End summary.
- 13. (C) USEU pol-mil officers met November 4 with DSACEUR'S EU POLAD for Operation ALTHEA, who is also a lead planner in the EU's Council Secretariat, to get the Council Secretariat views on progress between COMEUFOR and Commander Nato Headquarters (COMNHQ) Sarajevo on working out arrangements on the ground for delineating tasks between EUFOR and NHQ Sarajevo. DSACEUR intends to submit a letter November 4 to both the EU Military Committee and the NATO Military Committee laying out the agreed way forward in the document "Deconfliction and Delineation of Tasks (HQ EUFOR and NHQ Sa."

Reporting to the Military Committees

14. (C) DSACEUR Reith's original intention was to ask the Military Committee's to "note" this agreement between the respective commanders. Our contact pointed out that this "note" might cause problems within the EUMC, since the agreed way forward at this point is not in line with the EUMC Military Guidance of 27 Jul 04 on the subject; specifically, the "Agreed Mechanism" for task number G2 "Import and export of weapons and ammunition" states "Dual signature by (both COM's) on all import / export decisions." The preferred EU language, which was transmitted to DSACEUR yesterday, is "COMEUFOR will decide, following appropriate consultation and coordination with NATO SMR Sa." The EU Council Secretariat sees this as a compliance issue only and, therefore, as an EUFOR-only decision. The EU Council Secretariat asked that General Reith instead simply say that, as directed, the relevant commanders have developed implementation mechanisms for the delineation of tasks that in their view will work well, and that DSACEUR as Operational Commander has full confidence in the agreed procedures. In the Council staff's view, asking the EUMC to "note" the agreement would cause political friction since it would require the EUMC to sign up an agreement that is in some respects contrary to their quidance.

Consultation Mechanism

15. (C) The second possible point of contention for the EU is item G-9 "AFBiH Commanding Generals and General Staff Officers (ACGS)". Our contact reports that the EU side has absolutely no problem with this consultation taking place informally and on a regular basis. He did note, however, that this forum runs the risk of presenting opportunities for BiH participants to misperceive the relationship between COMEUFOR (compliance) and COMNHQ Sa (defense reform). To that end, they asked DSACEUR to add the following note under Agreed Mechanism: "Co-chairmanship runs the risk of allowing the ACGS to exploit a perceived weakness in the structure. Therefore, for reasons of clarity and reflection the TW 1. Therefore, for reasons of clarity and reflecting the EU lead, this should be an EU chaired group with NHQ Sa full participation. (EUMC 11560/3/04 dated 28 Jul 04)." made that recommendation, their clear preference is to remove the item altogether on the "quite acceptable" understanding that the commanders on the ground would normally employ such a mechanism in any case for its intended purpose. Highlighting it in this document, in their view, only results in increased tensions internally in the EU.

No Problems on PIFWC Language

16. (C) On PIFWCs and CT the EU Council Secretariat has no problems with the recommendations. Clearly, they are concerned that COMEUFOR might not be adequately informed regarding operations that could potentially involve forces under his command. At the same time, they are confident that the agreed arrangements will prevent such an occurrence. Specifically, their suggested language for item P-1 under Factors strikes out the phrase "NATO and EUFOR have similar mandates for support to the ICTY with PIFWC related operations" replacing it with "EUFOR will provide support to ICTY and relevant authorities, including the detention of PIFWCs. NATO will continue to provide support to the ICTY and will also have authority to detain PIFWCs." In addition, they would like to strike the word "troops" from the second bullet. Our interlocutor did note that the word "mandate" has a particular connotation -- hence their disagreement with the phrase as originally written. The EU Council Secretariat does not believe they have, nor do they seek, a mandate for EUFOR in PIFWCs.

The Way Ahead

17. (C) The EU side does not/not intend to raise any issues regarding the agreement. They will, rather, place their confidence in DSACEUR as the person charged with executing a vague political agreement. It is clear from talking with the EU staff that any political gain at this point would come at an operational cost; a trade-off they are unwilling to make. In the end, they don't really like the outcome, but in the interest of a successful operation, they are willing to live with it

18. (C) In the event the EUMC does not accept the document, a re-drafting exercise will be necessary. The EUMC guidance, which this document apparently contravenes on the issue of dual-signatures on arms export/import authorizations, is not repeated in either EU political documents or NATO documents, but it was, however, repeated in references in the CONOPS and OPLAN according to our source.

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